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ABSTRACT 
 
Analysis of the difference between the lowest and second lowest bids, or bid-spread, in a ‘lowest wins’ 
auction is of possible value in strategic bidding; providing an indication of mistakes in bids; 
determining a justifiable amount of bid security; and a means of providing some insight into the 
consequences of non-traditional auction arrangements.  Bid-spread analysis, as developed in this paper, 
provides some explanations concerning the nature of bids and their statistical properties.  In particular, 
it is shown here that, through the analysis of a data set of Hong Kong bidding data, that the bid-spread 
is directly (lineally) proportional to the contract size value.  The percentage bid-spread is found to be a 
function of the number of bidders and the lower order statistics of the uniform density function. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Bid spread, also variously termed “money left on the table” (Gates, 1960), “The Spread” (Park and 
Chapin, 1992) or just plain “spread” (Gates, 1960), is concerned with the difference between the lowest 
and second lowest bids. 
 
For bidders, the primary interest in bid spread is that it is “…… the amount by which the lowest 
tenderer is underbidding the second lowest tenderer and which therefore is foregone profit” (Runeson, 
1976). This has led to its development as a possible aid in strategic lump sum or unit price bidding 
(Gates, 1960) although the former has been criticised as resulting in fewer jobs won, with uncertain 
consequences (Park and Chapin, 1992). Bid spread has also the potential for use in identifying mistakes 
in bids and determining the maximum justifiable amount of bid security (Gates, 1960). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the “remarkable” sensitivity of strategic spread-based bidding to the 
status quo of projects won and lost has led Runeson (1976) to the conclusion that bidders are very 
much market oriented in their pricing, making the “foregone profit” unrecoverable in the face of the 
economic pressures involved. This leads to the conclusion that traditional lowest wins sealed bid 
auctions must produce subnormal profits in the long run due to the difference between the lowest and 
second lowest bids – a conclusion also reached by Nobel Lauriete William Vickrey (1981) in his 
general analysis of highest wins1 auctions. 
 
Despite these, what are to date, uncontested results there have been no apparent changes in the still 
predominent competitive bidding mode of construction procurement. Vickrey’s suggested correction to 
                                                          
1 The symmetry of highest and lowest wins auctions makes the distinction analytically trivial 
overcome the problem – that of awarding the contract to the lowest bidder at the second lowest price 
(now popularly termed the Vickrey Auction) – has never even been trialled. Why this is the case is not 
clear, though probably due to the counterintuitive nature of the objections to the lowest bid criterion. 
 
In this paper, we reexamine the empirical nature of bid spread, its modelling, explanation and 
prediction through the analysis of a data set of public building contracts in Hong Kong, Runeson’s 
interpretation and the Vickrey solution. 
 
 
 
2. Competitive environment for government works in Hong Kong 
 
The Hong Kong SAR Government operates an open tendering system for the vast majority of 
government construction works (Hong Kong Government, 1997). This open tendering system is based 
on lists of approved contractors in which the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. The Government 
lists of approved contractors are grouped according to type and size. There are five major types: 1) 
building; 2) port work; 3) waterworks; 4) site formation and 5) roads and drainage. Group A listed 
contractors are eligible to bid for contracts of up to HK$20 million, Group B for work up to HK$50 
million and Group C for work of unlimited value. 
 
The open tendering system gives contractors the freedom to select which contracts to bid for and the 
large numbers of listed contractors gives rise to a highly competitive environment (Fu and Drew, 
1999). In the data sample of public building contracts collected in Hong Kong, each contract attracts 
anywhere from 3 to 33 bidders and the average number of bidders is 13 per contract. 
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3. Data Set 
 
The data set collected consists of 267 public building contracts awarded between 1992 and 1996 from 
the Hong Kong SAR Government Architectural Services Department (ASD). These contracts comprise 
3,567 bids from 172 bidders tendering for 53 types of building works (including new work and 
alteration work) according to the CI/SfB classification. In order to eliminate the effect of price 
fluctuations over time, all the bids values were updated to a common base date (4th quarter of 1996), 
using the Hong Kong Government tender price index (TPI) published by ASD. 
 
From the data set, contracts for six building types for new work contracts were selected for further 
analysis. These six building types comprise 1,191 bids from 130 contractors tendering for 70 contracts. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for each building type. 
 
 
CI/SfB 
Code 
Contract Type No. of 
contract
s 
Mean no. 
of bidders 
Mean of 
Av. Bid 
spread 
Mean of 
Av. Comp. 
Con. Size 
Variance 
(HK$ M) 
342 Meat and Vegetable Market 11 15 9.85% 25.77% 60,250.14 
422 Clinic 8 19 4.37% 17.88% 3,299.38 
562 Sports complex 7 18 4.12% 19.68% 3,570.29 
712 Primary school 10 13 2.02% 14.85% 93.43 
713 Secondary school 25 17 3.37% 12.84% 475.88 
816 Government quarter 9 19 5.19% 16.27% 34,046.51 
 Whole data set 267 13 5.57% - - 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for various building types 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Gates’ (1960) analysis of bid results published by the USA State of Connecticut for 1957 to 1959 and 
the states of New Hampshire and Vermont from 1958 to 1959 found, “by the method of least squares 
[and log-log paper], the best fitting curve” (p18), to be 
 
p = 108C-0.266 
 
where p and C denote the percentage spread and lowest bid value respectively. In terms of dollars this 
is  
 
B = 1.08C0.734 
 
where B denotes the average (dollar) spread. 
 
In contrast, Runeson (1976) compared the mean bid/cost estimate ratios for the lowest and second 
lowest bid against the number of bids in the auction for his own data set of 265 contracts. This showed 
that not only do the average ratios for the lowest and second lowest bids reduce as the numbers of 
bidders in the auction increase, but also that the average difference between the ratios also reduces with 
increasing numbers of bidders. A simpler version of this finding was reported by Park and Chapin 
(1992) in their analysis of “60 recent jobs” in which they found the average spread to be 8.0, 5.8, 3.8 
and 2.0 percent on jobs having 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 10 to 12 and 13 to 15 bidders respectively, suggesting a 
linear model to be appropriate. 
 
It is clear, therefore, from a purely empirical perspective (none of the previous research having 
proposed a priori reasons) that two likely explanatory variables exist – the size value of the contract (as 
measured by Gates’ C) and the number of bids entered for the contract, to which we will refer for 
convenience sake as n.  Interestingly, none of the previous studies considered both variables, with 
Gates concentrating on C to the exclusion of n, and Runeson and Park and Chapin concentrating on n 
to the exclusion of C. 
 
Gates has also shown that transformations of both the dependent variable (spread) and the independent 
variables are likely to be beneficial, having used the raw (dollar) spread, percentage spread, log 
transformed spread, raw C and log C. 
 
In order to subject the data to as rigorous analysis as possible and yet avoid logistical and 
computational overload, we concentrated on the three forms of dependent variable (raw, percent and 
log spread) and four forms of each of the two independent variables (raw, square root, reciprocal and 
log – in order of increasing strength of transformation). 
 
In addition, in view of the lack of any theoretical basis for the choice of independent variables, one 
extra variable was added based on the properties of the order statistics uniform probability density 
function (rectangular distribution). Let s be the standard deviation of the uniform pdf, then the range, 
r=s√12. The difference between the expected value of the lowest and the expected value of the second 
lowest of a sample size n drawn from this distribution is γ=r/n, which is equivalent to γ= s√12/n. Of 
course, the γ here is based on expected values and is therefore only a mean value, ie., even if the data 
were drawn from a uniform distribution, γ would be the average result over a long set of trials and the 
results trials would bound to differ from this central tendency. However, γ was included nevertheless as 
an indicator of the likely amount of randomness of the spread. 
 
The full set of Pearson correlation coefficients for the ASD data set and indication of their significance 
(p<0.05) are given in Tables 2a-c. For Table 2a, the γ and all forms of n and C are significantly 
correlated with the raw spread for the whole data set.  However, the breakdown by building types 
indicate some important differences between types, with n being significant for types 613 and 816, C 
being significant for types 342, 422 and 816, and γ being significant for types 342 and 816.  The 
correlation pattern for the log spread (Table 2b) is similar. 
 
Contract 
Type 
n √n 1/n lnn C √C 1/C lnC γ 
342 -0.385 -0.406 0.441 -0.423 0.922 0.823 -0.337 0.657 0.989 
422 -0.306 -0.285 0.142 -0.248 0.736 0.670 -0.491 0.605 0.507 
562 0.140 0.176 -0.276 0.211 0.610 0.648 -0.520 0.643 0.507 
712 -0.205 -0.235 0.340 -0.269 0.469 0.482 -0.452 0.484 0.328 
713 -0.343 -0.351 0.322 -0.350 0.106 0.107 -0.092 0.105 0.259 
816 -0.906 -0.935 0.965 -0.954 0.877 0.825 -0.469 0.727 0.958 
Whole set -0.224 -0.238 0.252 -0.249 0.642 0.584 -0.285 0.489 0.715 
Bold Italics = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 2a: Correlations: Raw spread 
 
 
 
 
Contract 
Type 
n √n 1/n lnn C √C 1/C LnC lnγ 
342 -0.335 -0.354 0.406 -0.372 0.688 0.655 -0.395 0.587 0.710 
422 -0.318 -0.298 0.179 -0.266 0.746 0.695 -0.519 0.637 0.604 
562 -0.052 -0.008 -0.130 0.038 0.632 0.639 -0.477 0.610 0.656 
712 0.022 0.001 0.079 -0.024 0.388 0.367 -0.245 0.335 -0.050 
713 -0.283 -0.288 0.266 -0.287 0.071 0.073 -0.076 0.075 0.317 
816 -0.860 -0.872 0.862 -0.875 0.768 0.713 -0.384 0.617 0.793 
Whole set -0.211 -0.226 0.245 -0.238 0.477 0.531 -0.456 0.550 0.584 
Bold Italics = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 2b: Correlations: ln spread 
 
 
Contract 
Type 
n √n 1/n lnn C √C 1/C lnC γ% 
342 -0.339 -0.383 0.523 -0.429 -0.023 -0.084 0.111 -0.135 0.686 
422 -0.409 -0.400 0.300 -0.378 0.484 0.401 -0.185 0.321 0.103 
562 0.168 0.205 -0.304 0.241 0.254 0.306 -0.252 0.324 0.030 
712 0.018 -0.010 0.107 -0.041 0.069 0.069 -0.033 0.063 -0.276 
713 -0.355 -0.369 0.361 -0.375 -0.211 -0.226 0.251 -0.239 0.196 
816 -0.593 -0.547 0.430 -0.501 0.105 0.004 0.332 -0.124 0.536 
Whole set -0.232 -0.247 0.271 -0.260 -0.069 -0.082 0.057 -0.084 0.245 
Bold Italics = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 2c: Correlations: % spread 
For the percenatge spread, however, the significant correlations for C forms dissappear, leaving the n 
forms significant for the whole set and type 713 and the γ significant for the whole set and type 342. 
 
Which of these three analyses gives the best results is hard to say as, with different forms of dependent 
variable, they are not directly comparable.  It is clear, however, that the dissappearance of the C 
correlations in Table 2c indicates that the spread is directly (lineally) proportional to the contact size 
value for, if it was not directly proportional the correlations would not have dissappeared. 
 
It is not clear why the differences between types occur, except perhaps that the rather small samples 
sizes may be an obscuring factor.  What does seem to be worthy of note, however, is that the results for 
the n forms and γ are quite similar for the whole set.  This is not entirely surprising, as γ is simply the 
reciprocal of n but multiplied by the standard deviation for the auction, which suggests that either the 
standard deviations are roughly constant for each auction or that they vary in a random fashion.  As 
Table 1 shows, the standard deviations (square root variance) for the building types are quite different, 
with the smaller variances seemingly corresponding with smaller percentage spreads, so it is possible to 
rule out the constant standard deviation assumption. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The difference between the lowest and second lowest bids in a ‘lowest wins’ auction is of interest as it 
represents the lowest bidder’s “foregone profit”, and thus of possible value in strategic bidding; 
providing an indication of mistakes in bids; determining a justifiable amount of bid security; and a 
means of providing some insight into the consequences of non-traditional auction arrangements.  Bid-
spread analysis, as developed in this paper, provides some explanations concerning the nature of bids 
and their statistical properties.  In particular, it is shown here that, through the analysis of a set of Hong 
Kong bidding data that that the bid-spread is directly (lineally) proportional to the contract size value.  
The percentage bid-spread is found to be a function of the number of bidders and the lower order 
statistics of the uniform density function.  This suggests the underlying factors influencing bid-spread 
are both competitive, as measured by n, and due to random processes, as measured by γ and therefore 
offers some vindication for the statistical basis of bidding theory. 
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